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LN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~ri' _\ 'rE ()'F~ t~T ... ~H, 
Ploi;1ll_rf and 1?.~).-:;poudcnlt 
-v~ .. ---
.~ t~~~~}~ ~1. ( t~\RCIA~ tT 1{.~ 
D c i · e ; u !1. t 1 1 t. o nr l .... 4. p p P. I If 1 J d. 
) 
I 
I 
( ) 
I 
Casn No .. 
fl092 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On the :!-±th dn~- of ~-\ Llg·nst ~ 19~)S~ at approxin1ately 
S:OO p.1n., LeRoy ~Toseph \~c(nPt' 1\·a~ lUlled. rl,he de-
cedent 1vas an -tnmate at tl1e 1 ~tah State I)rison, and 
the ho1nieide O(lf·t~rred at the Prison in the attic to 
Cell I~ lock A. The kilh n g \Vas ae.eorn p lis h cd hy }daek 
1\Ierr] l1 ll i Y(lll b u r·gh ~ J t·~ { l {. :~.~I~ :-:;s. 7, GOG and 7~ 1 ) ~ 'I'hrre 
"'-,.ere t\\-o other innu.t b_l ~ p J'( ·~(' nl. in the attic at the 
t iHte of the killing:t Leonard \Yarner Bnwne, and the 
appellant in this n1a tter, tT e ~~{_~ ~I. (} arcia~ J-r. 
Earlier that evening, It1venhnrgh told the defendant 
to go get a knife ( R. 717). rrtu~ defendant 'vent to an-
1 
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other inmate, Darrel Stark and told hint that Riven-
burgh "\van ted tl~e lmife (R. ;~o~, 305, 364 and 365). ''Then 
tl1e defendant returned, Rivenburgh told him to go up-
stairs \,~jt11 Bo\vne and stand point (serve as a lookout) 
1rvhile ltivenburgh engaged in an act of I>Crv-ersion 'rith 
the decedent (R. 717 and 718). 
The defendant and llovlne \Vent into the attjc. a fe"\v 
1nmutes prior to tlle arrival of R.1vcnburgh and the 
decedent { 1~. 718) ~ .A. ftc r the la t le r t \VO had entered the 
attic, Itivenburgh spoke to l~o\vne to 1nake sure he and 
Garcia "\Vere standing \vatch. J~owne left the defendant 
by a ventilator, anrl \vPnt to cloHe a grating \\~hich 
covered. the pJ ace of entry (Ft. 71 S) ~ ~;\ t tl1 is i nt5ta.Tl t a 
rueknt:1 started ( Il. "718 ) .. 'There 'vas lHJllcring and kicking!t 
and a great deal of noise ( ll. 719) ~ Because of fear~ 
de i'endant ran to help l1.ivenburgh pro teet 1l1Ht8elf { 1t 
412 and 413). 11he defendant v,;ras kicked 1Jy ~oTncone~ 
He believed it 'vaH the decedent (R-r 719). The defendant 
tried to '"'"get~' the decedent and grabbed l1is leg~ (It 
383 and 719). There "-as Ht,visting and turning all over 
the placeH (R. 719). Rivenburgh lost his lrnife and asked 
for help to find it. The defendant let go of decedenf~ 
h"\~~!t and in the dark attic, attempted to find the lost 
knife (R~ 719). Defendant felt so1uething \Yet and sticky, 
and \Vns very rnuch afraid (R. 719). Rivenburgh said, 
,;;Let's split'' (I=t .. 7~0 ), and the defendant follo"\ved hi1n 
out of the attic. 
~4 fter leaving tl1e attic, the three ''Ti th the help of 
other inntah~s disposed of tl1e bloody clothing and es-
tablished alibis ( R.. 409 and 720). Sometime later, the 
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defendant eorJcluded that the decedent had been killed 
( lt 7~1) .. \t no tin1e did the dl~fendant hit the decedent 
'vith either his fists or a knife ( [{. 719 and 720). At no 
ti1ne did the defendant take part in any plan to kill 
the dceedent or e1dertain any intent to kill (lt aS;}, 
410 and. 7~ 1.)4 ~PJ1e derendant first learned of Rivell-
burgh'.s intent to kill tlHJ d(.~cedent and of the actual 
killing \V hile alibis \V(L re being di~z~us~cd aft e·r the k i l! in.~'. 
rl,h1s ~~a~ "~hen Rivenburgh, Dalton~ Stark~ and the de-
fendant 'vere 11la~~ing cards just before check-in ti1nc 
(9 :00 p.1n.) ( 1L :318 fliJO ~);_~5). The defendant 1va.s pre~c~!l t 
during ~uh~Pq uent C()nversations 'vherein R-ivenburg~ ~~s 
intent nnd net~ \\.Cl't~ diseu~s0.d (l{. :~lS, :~-t0, 3~0~ 37~:-
37 7, 408 and 409), but at no tIn u: before the killing did 
l1e kno~~ that Rivenburgh jntcnded to kill the rlerP.denL 
On the contra r~-, defendant thougl1t ht~ \VU:;; going to 
t}l P attic to stand point for an act of so durn y { R. 340, 
380, 381, 397, 4GO, 4G1, 47 8, 717 and 718). 
Tesi.!nlony 'va~ introduced coneerning a conversa~ 
tion bet \\'Cen l { lven h1 Lrgh and an other in1na te~ Itandel, 
'dtich took place on the ~-+tlL of August prior to the 
hornieide .. The drugged condition of the doc.cdcnt 'vas 
discus~ed~ The dect,l{}ent, as \Vell as other inmates in-
vol\·cd, including the ''itnes~es for the state, had taken 
rxee~~ive amounts of amphetin1ine pills over a perind 
of days prior to the homieide. During this conver·sation, 
Rivenburgh re1narked that solt~ebod~y 'vas going to cut 
off the der.edenr'~ head if he continued to act as he had. 
This led Rivenburgh and Randel to a general discussion 
of various method~ of homicide. Such talk \vas eorn-
monplace at the prison. Rivenburgh had threatened to 
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kill others on many occasions \\·ithout doing so (R. 4-tS 
and 4-;J.t-) ~ _._4._ t the tune of t1 ~ i ~ (' nnversati on, the defendant 
\\·a~ not pre~enL He and another intnate, Dripps, ·w·ere 
in another cell ( R. 4.:20 and -1--1-7), and n ejther of then1 
heard the eonversation .. 
Indulging i11 aruphet.i•n lnes and other drugs, pos-
~est:Jing knifes, threatening deattl~ and engahring in acts 
of sodorny "\Vcre not unusual attivi tie~ for inrnates of 
the Utah State Pris011 at thj~ tin1c -- espf.~(~ia11y R·iYen~ 
burgh. It "\Vas a common practiee for in1nates to .~tand 
point for eae.h other ( R. ;~SH-:~ss). 
rJ:hc defendant \Vas convicted of murder in the first 
rlegrcc. ~rhe detailed te~ti1nony introduced supports all 
of the~~ fact~. \~l e \vill refer to tl](_~ details of the testi-
lnony as they bceoua~ applicable in stating our argurncnts .. 
POINT I. 
DEFE)JDANT \\,.AS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE 
AN r:rvTPARTI AL JURY IN TlLA.'f 1,11E TRIAL JL""DGE II\f-
r'ROPERLY COM:\-f1TKICATED 'VITII A JUROR.. 
POINT II. 
DE:F'ENDANT \;tlAS l)L)TIED DUE PROCESS OF LA"\V 
IN V'"IOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE l~NITED 
STA:TES~ AME~D. XIV A~D TII~ CONSTITCTION OF 
C~i' A li ~ ART+ I:r '§,12 r ):]" THA 1, I IE \VAS D E~IED HIS RIGHT 
TO BE PRESENT AT ALL S'TAGES IN THE PROCEEDINGS. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL I~ THAT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE RECI::::IVED AN 11\fPROPER Qt;ESTION 
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FROl\f A JUROR AND TRANSI\'IITTED THIS IMPROPER 
(~UESTION TO COUNSEL. 
POINT IV+ 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTI~G DE-
FE~DANT~S ~lOTION TO DIS:\IISS AND DEFENDA~TrS 
:.TOTIO~ FOR A DIRECTED ·vERDI.CT SINCE THE JURY 
COlTLD NOT HAVE FOUND BE.YOKD A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT TilE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF 
n.fCRDER+ 
POINT V. 
THE TRL~L COURT ERRED TN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFEKDA~·T'S REQUESTED INSTRuCTION NO~ 43. 
POINT ,ri. 
THE rrRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO+ 20 IS CON-
FUSING AND IN ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SEPAR-
ATE THE CRIME OF SODOMY FROM THE CRIME OF 
J\.fURDER. AND l)J" I'TS ABS~rRA·CT FORM COULD ALLOW 
THE JURY TO ~,IND TilE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF 1\-IUR--
DER IF THEY BELIEVED HE AIDED AND ABETTED IN 
THE ACT OF SODOI\IY. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL CO.L,TRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 17 .. 
POINT VIII.. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSTI\'G TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQGESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 19 AND 
NO~ 2L 
POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT·s REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20+ 
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POIN·T Xr 
TilL TRIAL COURT ERRED r:-f FAILING TO CQ}fPEL 
THE PROSECUTION TO FURXISH TAPE RECORDINGS 
A~D COPIES OF STATETh-IENTS 1\'IADE BY WITNESSES 
A)ID 'rilE DEFENDANT~ 
POINT XT. 
THE rrRIAL CO"CRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A 1\'"E\V TRIAL. 
POINT XII. 
TilE TRlA.L COURT f~RRED IN D8~YlNG DEFEND~ 
ANT'S J\fOTION TO STRIKE TESTI1fONY WHICH WAS 
AD1IIT'rED ON THE STATE!>S REPRESE~T~I\.!TION THAT 
IT WOULD SHOW A CONSPIRACY TO CQMI\'IIT MURDER. 
POINT XIII. 
THE TRIAL COl~RT ERit~D IN SUBI\1ITTI~G THE 
CASE TO THE J"LRY ON 'THE QUESTION OF 1\fURDER 
IN THE FIRST DEGREE SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW~ 
DEFEKDANT'S ]riENTAL CONDITION Plt.EVENTED HII\1 
FROM PREl\l~DlTATING OR DELIBERA1~ING. 
ARG·Cl\lBNT 
POINT L 
DEFE~DANT \V~.\S DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE 
}1~ Il\oiPARTIAL JURY IN THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE IJI-
PROPERLY COJL.\lUl\'IC .. :\.T~D WITH A Jl~ROR. 
On lhP la~t. day of the t1·ial~ the trial judge requested 
coun ~el to 1neet '\Y1th hin1 in chan1bers~ 1-I c~ then related 
a <~onvPrsation 'vhicl1 had taken place het,11.recn himself 
and one of the jurors~ ~rhe trial judge stated as f ollov.rs: 
'•rl1h1~ 1110 rning about 8 :30, a juror by the 
narne of Armstrong, asked n1e, as I arrived at 
6 
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the Courthouse~ if he eould ask me a question~ 
and I told hi1n ,. Yes.~~ 
'~ i I P caine into (~harnbers, and he asked if 
the parties vlere going to introduce the tapes of 
the conversation bet\veen the t\vo defpndnnl s. 
"I told him I did not kno\v~ I 'vould tell coun-
sel that he had asked and leave it up to counseL. 
'~ ll P ah;o said that he "\\7as ansiou8 LsI e] to 
knov,r, it '\'as i1nportant~ because he could not f!'CL 
an ans,ver to a question in his mind, as to \\·ho 
did the stabbing. 
~~He said there vva8 evidence that Garcia had 
the knife in the attic, in his hand, and that later 
on, another person had the knife, and he did not 
kno\v 'vho did the stabbing. 
"I told h1 rn that l \v·ould r.·ela~.e hi~ q ucsl ions 
to coun~el, and leave it up to c.onnsel to either 
atte1npt to re-open their case and pnt in more 
evidence to clarify or takP r..are of the matter on 
argument.'~ (R. 855 and 856) .. 
This ar.tion on the part of the trial judge 'vas irnproper, 
prejudicial, and certainl_,. const i t.u10.s a re,Tersihle errot·. 
See State Y. (_~rank~ 105 Utah 332, 1..1-~ P~2d 178 ( 1948) ; 
State v~ Anderson,. 65 l~tah + h\ ~37 .Pac .. D-~1 ( 1925); 
State v .. Thornet 9G l~tah 208, 117 Pac. 58 (1911). 
The ~tatutt\s of this 8tate are explicit in regard to 
cornn1unication "\Yith the jury. The officer in charge of 
the jury must be sworn, ~~ .... to suffer no person to 
speak to them or communicate v,;rj_th them, nor to do HO 
himself, on any subject connected ~ith the trial, .... '" 
Utah Code .linn .. § 77 -31~27 ( 1953). 
7 
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rrhe court lnust adtnoni~h the jul'y at each aajourn-
ment, " ... tl1at it is their duty not to eonvL·r~(~ among 
i..hen1~elves -uvr -~tith (Ul:JJone else on any suhjeet con-
neeted \Vi th the trial~ . . . ~~ T~ tah l ~ou c l~ .. nnr ~ 7 7-31-28 
( 1953) (Etnphasis Hdded.). 
It is elementary that connnnni~at.ion 1vith t.he jury 
must be p1~cvcutcd if the defendanl is to have a fair 
triaL .A.rticle 1, -~ 1~ of the Utah (_~onstitution guarantee~ 
tlt e def en dan t a trial by an impartial jury. Certainly 
tl1 is irn partiality cannot be inH u red if improper com-
nntnication o,vitlt the jury is allo\\red. See State v~ .... -\n-
de t•:-jon~ C·3 T~ tall 415, ~37 Pac. 941 ( 19:2;~)). rrhe faet tltn t. 
the conununieant "\VH~ the judge dot~~ not n_\JnPdy the 
(:rroe .. To the contrary, tlu: official office of the judge 
rnake~ the co1nrnun ieat.ion all 1 he n1or·c prejudh~ial, for 
the infonnation tlJe juror rr1ight ga1n.t .intentionally or 
indavertantly, Vt'ould carr.v Hllt(·h greater force. Tl1e 
court in Sargent 'r· Robert~~ 1 Pick. (Ma~s.) 337 ~ 11 An1. 
Dec. 185 ( 13.:23), stated as follow:.;: 
'~It i.:-;. not sufficient to stty that U1i~ po1ver i~ 
in hands highly respont5)1Jle for the proper exer-
ei:-;e of it: the only sure \vay to prevent all ,jeal-
ousie8 and ~us pieiun s i ~ 1.o eonsider the judge as 
having no control \vhatever over the ea~e .. cxr.Ppt 
in open court, in prP~Pnce of the part 1c~ and 
their cormsel. The public interest requires that 
litiga.t.in~ part1e~ ~l1ould have nothing to complain 
of or suf;per.t in the admini~tration of justice, 
and tlte convenience of juror~ i~ of small con-
giderat1on {~.ornpared "\Yith this great object'' 
The juror rrlu8t be carefuJ to hold himself above 
suspicion~ In State v. Andel'son~ 6.J l:tah 415, :237 Pac .. 
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~)-I: 1 ( 1 ~ l~:~)), it appeared that the prosecuting \\'i tnes s 
had given u juror a ride to an~l fnnn the ronrt (•YPry(lny 
or the trial. The (_T tah court 8tated as foll ("l\\~S: 
H ..... it should nlso be remembered that~ \v-hcn 
a juror 1~ sehlcted h~r reason of his i1npartiality 
til detenu inP not only the property rigllb:; hf'-
1 \\·Pen individuals, but in criminal eases the per-
~~~ Jnal lihert~· of individuals charged 'vith offenses, 
t.hP. law requires of the ,juror such conduct during 
that ti1ne that his verdict rnay be above snspirion 
~ls to its having been ini'lur~need h~r any eonduct 
on his part during the trial. .. /' 
In ~tate v. 'l'hoTnet 96 lftah 208, 117 Pac. 58 { 1911.), 
a juror tnl ked to ~o1neone over the telephone~ 1 t \r ns 
held that tl1i~ un~xplained communication amounted to 
mi!5conduct. The 1 :t.nh court in so holding stated as 
follo,vs: 
~~To obtain the free and d i~ pn.~ f:d onn.l e j ndg-
Inent of jurors in the trial of capital cases, long 
expericne<._ .. ln1~ dcn1onRtrated tllf~ nece8sity of pre-
venting the jury from mingling or conversing 
\\' 1 th the peoplP, and of keeping them secluded 
fro1n all outside influences calculated to inter-
fere \Vith or affect their impartiality or .judginent~ 
These ~afegnards ""iere at cornrnon la"\v deemed 
essential to the right itself of trial by jury .. That 
right ''""~th it~ aneient safeguard~ ha.s been pre-
f·a~rvcd i Il thi ~ eonn try hy (~onstl tutions and ~tat­
ntPs. An infraction of It caieulated to itnpair th~ 
right cannot properly rerr1ve the sanction of tl1e 
court "\vithout. doing violence to su('.h constitu~ 
tiona! and statutory provisions. If it should be 
thought that they no longer serve a useful pur~ 
pose, let then1 be abolished and taken out of the 
Constitution and statute and others substituted 
in their place. As long as they remain~ it is the 
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duty of the ('Ourt~ to sr~e that they are observed 
and obeyed." 
1'1lis Cou t't ha.s dealt ,r·itl1 tl1e problem of connnuni-
rat.ion Vlith the jury on othPl' occasion~~ Tn State v~ 
Crank~ .1 05 l itah :t~2, 14:2 P . .:!s 178 ( 1943 L a juror con-
versed \Vi th the prosecuting \VltllCS~. rllhi~ \\'aS ~a]d to 
lle improper even thougl1 the cornmunieation \Vas 1nercly 
fo1· the purpose of retH~,\·ing an old friendship .. The 
Court stated tbat, "[i]n such instance::;~ the VPrrliet or 
the jury, like CneHar'~ "\\~ife, ~n-ast be abot-e ,·nlspiciull~~' 
Otl~er ju1isdictio n~ have con.sidere d the question 
of (·ouununieation \vith the jury~ and the general rule 
holds sueh improper acti vi.ty to be reversible~ ln Doles 
v. State, 97 J nri. 555 ( 1 SS--+ ), tl1e UlH~xplained presence of 
tho bailiff in the ju1·y roont requi r·ed a ne'v triaL In 
T) 1 C1 b · · ~)-g ;\f · · 1 73 'l.-:--1 ""\.~ '\r -r-:6 ( 1 °3~) 
.c eo p e v. 1an1 e 1 s, ...... { h 1 e L , ~ t ~, • · ~ tl:D t' ' , 
a ne\V trial \1-·as ordcrr~d even thnugh the bailiff c\ntererl 
tl1e jury room at. the req1H'St of the jnry to provide 
tohaeco and 1~;-aterr lt Is ('lear that any disr.ussion of 
the cas P. b~y- t..h e bailiff in r,ha r ge of the jury 1\ri th the 
jurors 'vill entitle the defendant to a nevl triaL S-ee 
Taylor v. State, 18 Ala~ ... -\.pp. +Gti, 93 So. 78 ( 19~~-); 
Peo plt~ v. ICa 'voleRld, 313 Ill. 2~) 7, 1-t:i X~E. 203 ( 19:!-l) ; 
l~rarnlett v. State~ 129 N P.h~ 1 SO~ ~nt ::\.'\Y·. 166 ( 1935). 
There are many cases in vnlving r.o1nnnrnirat.ion 1vith 
the jury by the judge~ In State v. ~Iurphy, 17 N.D. 4S~ 
115 N. ''r~ S-+ ( lDOS) t the eon duct of the judge in di8euss~ 
ing the case \Vith the jnry in the jury room after their 
retirement for deliberation 'vas held prejudicial error, 
rega.rdlcs~ ol' ·w·hetJ1er the partic.ular conversati011 jn-
10 
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fluenced their dp(·i~ion. In the recent TTtah <'HKf\ Johnson 
,~. :\1 a y nard. ~ l r I ah 2d ~~ ;~, ~~-t~, P .:.!( l 884 ( 1959) ~ the 
trial judge entprcd the~ ju r·y roon~ to ans"\ver a que;--;tion. 
This \,·as done in the absence or and w·i thout the consent 
or COUnsel, ~\ J'tpr the incident the trial _j udg-~~ advi;:.;ed 
coun~Pl nnd for the record n1ade a general state1nen t 
of 1vhat \\·n~ donP~ 
T~hc l; tah court held the conduct of the judge to 
be i1nprtqH~r e\'Pil though there '\\·as no ( l uestlon of his 
good in ten ti on H. S i Tn i lar activity· '\\7a~ 1 u_~ ld to be prPjn~ 
dicial P tTor in t~,erdcrer Y. I\ orthern PaeiJ'i(~ 1{:-·., 7;) 
I\ rD . 13 9, 2G N". \\ ~.. 2d ~: ~ G ( 1.9-1:7 ) . ~ e e also State v. \\' n l t e, 
1:3~) \\'a~ h. G7 ~ ~:):-{ P~H~~ 617 ( 1 ~J~~-l) ( atte1npteu ru l) 1~~ • J •• \·) ; 
B Sit ·)~ .... I:) ')(J() · Okl C1 • R 19.::)0 ) ennet t v. a tt~~ ~ l t • nt~. r l. ~ a. r1n1.. e P~ . ~.1 
(a~ ~a ul t to do hod i 1 y harrn) ; \ r a caster v. 8ta t e~ 17:2 
.i\rk. ~~~;~~ ~Ul S. \Y-. SCl (10~7) (1nurder ~ judge talked t.n 
foreman in hall outside of jury room; eonvittion re-
versed even though Ye1·diet had already been ngreerl 
upon); State v .. .Jlattltt\\·s~ 191 ~.(~. 37S, 131 t;,R~ 74:~ 
( lH:!ti) (murder) : Sl!il·ld::J v~ l T ni ted States, ~73 lJ.S~ 5S~~~ 
( 1D.:!7) ( eonspiru ~;7 to viola tc~ prohibi ton act) ; ''Ti11iarn s 
v. ( 1onlmon"\vealth, .:207 1\ y. S07 ~ ~70 S~ '\7".. Gl ( 1 [}~;)) 
(selling intoxicating liquor) .. 
The only sure \Yay to prL·vc1•t ~l~spicions of unfair-
nPs~ and pn:.;sihle impair1nent of eonfidence in the in-
tPg-r i i y of the r·o ll rt. is to con~ider t 11 e j udgc n ~ having 
no eontrol over· the case except in open court in the 
presence of counsel and the parties. See Sargent v. 
R-ohert~, 1 Pick.. ( ~~ af.;s.) :~;;7 J 11 .. A.m. Dec. 185 ( 18:?3). 
All questions of the jury should be considered here 1 and 
11 
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if an ans \VCr can properly be given, it should be given 
here .. The public intere~t requires that litigating par-
ties should hav,_~ nothing to con1plain of or ~uspect in 
tho adu1inistration of justice. (~ertainly thi~ int.ere~t 
is greatl~r w1lcn the ea~e it5 a cri1ninal one and the crime 
i~ punishable h y de a lh. The 1nain tC11ance of high idea 1 s 
in this respect stems fro1n con~f·iousness on the part 
of U1osc ,,..·ho participate in 1 rials that proceedings are 
open to the publjc. 
In State v .. ~Iurphy, 17 N~D4 -±S, 115 X~t~l. 84 (1908)~ 
the court stated as follo\vs: 
~~ ,.;\,.-.; to the pu rit.Y of the in t.ent1 ons of the 
judge in going .Jnt.o the jury room in this case, 
and there having the brief communication "With 
the jury~ no certificate or proof is necessary so 
far as this court is concer-ned, as it 'vell knows 
that his uprightnc8s and ~incere desire to be ab-
S<~lutely ,ju~t and fajr in all cases are beyond 
q nestionL tllhat admitted fact, ho-\vever, doe~ not 
meet the question before us, \\~hich 1s: JJld he 
do tl1at \vhich \Yas beyond hi~ judicial functions 
in rP~ p(~(~!: to tile easc-1 \Ve are forced to the con-
clusion that he he did .. IIis presence in the jury 
roorn for any kind of eommunication \vith the 
jury is not conte1nplated b~- auy provision of the 
sta.tute4 Tl1e opposite is the plain interference 
from the R ta.tu te. .All corn I nunica tion to the jury 
in open court i ~ subject to exception by the par-
tie~, if deemed ilnproper. If any co1nmunication 
is n1ade to them in the j11ry room in the absence 
of the parties, no opportuni t.\· is afforded for 
objections and exceptions at the tizne4 The open 
court i~ tlu~ place for co1nmunications to the jury 
in the presence of, or on no tire to the attorneys. 
The jury room is for the jury alone, and no torn-
12 
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rnuni(·ati on~ n re nl1o,ved ,.,rith then1 i11 the room 
exrE ~ p ~ l L pon o rdP rH frotn the court through the 
officer in (' ha rge of them~ v,cho is penni tted to 
ask them \vhether they have agreed upon a ver-
dict. .:\11 co1nrnunications to the jury In referenee 
to the case should be made in open court, and 
all colnlnunic.ation~ to them in the jury roorn 
avoided. In this 'vay· all distrust and fear that 
~olnPt h illg i1nproper i~ said or done "·ill be ·with-
out foundation~ and every act be subjcet to ex-
ception and r<._~vie\v ... A TJ.V corrnnunication by V{ord 
or ''" ~·iti11~~ r1ot )n open <·on r-t affp(·t H the ef,.ieienr~~ 
of jur)' tl'lals as a 1neans of accomplishing justice 
after g[Yin~; all parties full opportunity of being 
hPard at all stages of the triaL A str1f~t (•onl-
pliance V~-"ith this practice of having all proceed-
ings in court in the presence of counsel, or on 
notite to thenl~ unle~H ,,·ai ved, i~ better than to 
eount.enance violat.lou~ thereof unlP~~ prPjndice is 
shO\\·n. ~ .. \Ve think that any communication in 
this "~ay as to thP case should l1e prohibited and 
held prejudicial It is against the policy of the 
la\v to indulge in secret comrrtunications or con-
ferences \vitlJ the jury or 'vith jurors jn refer~ 
enee to the lncritf.! or la'v of the rase. To determine 
in each case \Yhether prejudice resulted would 
be difficult, if not impossible, and justice 'viii 
be better served by avoiding such communica-
tions entirely. The authol·itiL~s are practically 
unani.Inou~ in condemning- such comtnnnication~t 
and in holding them prejndiejal as a 1natter of 
law.'' 
See also State v. "\ r roth, 15 \\'ash. 621 , ..t 7 P a e. 10 6 ( 18 96). 
The comntnnieation in the Jl-urphy case took place 
in the jury roorn, \YhiJe as in the instant easP the com-
munication \\·as )n the judge~s charnbcrs. This distinction 
makes little difference indeed. 1,he conversation be-
13 
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t\veen the judge and the juror \vas a se<"·ret conve n:;a-
ti on. 'fhe defeudan t 'Ya~ not gi\Ten notice, and v.,ras 
afforded no opporiunl t~v to be present lie had no ehance 
to objctt to the questions or the ans"\vers, and is not 
even sure or what was said or the nnpaet that it rnay 
l1ave had on this jury. 
'The defenda11t haf.; no burden of sho\ving that the 
communication \Vas prejudicial to his caRe or that the 
content of the conversation involved prejudicial matters 
or pertained to the ca~e. One reason for thi~ rille V{as 
~tated in Sta-te v. Jlur1;h.y, :supra. ~argent v~ Roberts, 
1 Piek~ ( Ma:.-:;~~) 337, 11 AnL Dec~ 180 ( 1823), also put 
forth ttl is n_.a~on and in t:10 uo1n~; stated: 
~ .. As it is in1pos~ible, "\Ve think, to complain 
of the ::Jub8tanee of the eornruunieation, tlJe- only 
que~tlon is 'vhether an:y eort1rnunicat i un at all is 
p1·oper; and, if 11 wa~ not, the party a.galn~t whon1 
the verdi ei \vas is en ti tied to a ne1v- triaL,' 
See also Fina ~l~ llnited States, 4G F+~d 643 (10th Cir. 
1931) ~ 
ln State v~ Thorne~ B6 T_;ta 11 ~US~ 117 Pac. 58 (1911) 
the state offered no evideneP. lo di~pu te the defendant, 
and did not atte1npt to ~ho"\v that the ronHnunication 'va8 
harrnlcs~r r:rhe state argue(] that prPjudic.e tnnld not 
be presumed fro1n an unexp1aincd communication. It 
\\Tas their po~ition that the defendant 1vas required to 
sho\v that harJnful intorn~ation ·wa~ con1municated to 
the jnror and that this infor1nation tended to influence 
h.i.s deliberations and verdict, and until such was shO\Yll, 
the state 'vas not re( 1 uircd to sho\v the contrary 4 
14 
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The l~tah court stated a~ follo·w·s: 
~·rt_,hat rule n1igl1t \vell be applied to rom-
lHLilti<"~-n 1 ions het \\·een a juror aTHi n person hav1ng 
no int{~r·est jn tl1e litigation~ v.,r"hich \\·er·e author-
i~.~~d and rHd f'o t·bidderL lt Jrla_\" hP p t'(~RlllllPd t.ha j 
a jul'o r, \\·ho pPnding- thp trial, 0 t· n f't.er the re-
til'PtllPnt OI' the jur~- to (·onHidCt' of th<\ir V(•fOi(·jt 
rul( 1 not forh1dden to do sol ron1mnnicates \vith 
one~ a ~ trange r ~ ( l., and not in~ r. rP~ tP.rl j n the li 1 i-
g·a tiont co1n1nnn ieated about son1ething not re~ 
lated to the case or the parties. _._~n unexplained 
communieation under such circu1nstances 1vould 
not an1onnt to misconduct, unless the circum-
~ t u n(·e~ attending it "~e rp s nth as to ind u~e an 
infe r(lnee of ~ou1e w·rong-ful or j 1n proper condtH~L 
T n s uf~ h en ~e a pre~ u n L pj ron o i" prej ndic.e shon ld 
not be indltlged from an unexplained communi-
cation even though fro1n the attending circum-
stances it 1nay be said that the conduct \vith 
rcspeet to it \Ya:-; of dou1Jtful pl'Opriet~~~ But here 
the (~onunun !cation had, under the circ~urnstances 
disclosed, \rn~ unauthorized and forbidden .. If it 
\Vas neeessary for the juror to communicate "\vith 
someone over the telephone or other,vise, the 
Inatter should l1avc h(l<.\n ea1lcd to tl1e at.tention 
of the (!OU rt "~ho could haYe grant~d or refused 
the perTni~~[on as t.hP ex lgenries or the ra~e re-
quired. rro hold f.;UCh private communications, 
under the circumstance~, a part fro1n and in the 
absence of his fellu\v jurors, and "\vithout the 
court ~s perm.i8sion, certainly 1,~a~ miscond u c.t .. 
8ueh conduct cannot be tolerated and thP. purity 
of tl1e jurr rnaintained. To permit it and to 
e-xcuse it as to one juror requires a permi~sion 
of it to others~ rpo do that l~ to allow members 
of the jury t.o he brought in contact with out-
siderst and to afford them an opportunity to 
hold prejudicial communications ahont the case~ 
or at least to expose them to such harmful and 
15 
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prejudicial influences.. rl,he juror here by hi::; 
mi~conrl uet expo sed himself to such influences~ 
\"\That the juror said over the teJ<..-.phone, or \vhat 
\vas Haid to 111 n1~ i~ not n1adc ~ o appear. Had 
his eond uet in sueh partleu lar not lJecu nl i scon-
duet~ perhap~ the pre~urnption might be indulged 
that. \vhat \vas f;aid by hi1n or eo1nmrmicated to 
hirn "\Vas entirely per~onal to him and unrelated 
to the ease until tlH~ contrary ,\-u~ 1uade to appear. 
llut he did something 'vl1i{!l1 he ,\·as unauthorized 
and forbidd(~n to ~lo. He "\Vas a contemnor and 
a "\Vrongdoes. ~,rom the misconduct d.is closed and 
tl1e exposure of the juror to harmful influence,. 
prejudiec 1~ pre~urncil, and the burden cast on 
the state to sho-\V what the communication was,. 
and that it \Vas harmless and could not have in~ 
f]nenced or affected t1le deliberation of the juror 
or his verdict. 4 •• 
~~ ... To say that the accused cannot sustain 
his claim of prejudice until he al~o sho\\7 6 that 
the juror talked about ~OJnething harmful to 
the accused's rjghis is to fritter away the con-
s tit Lttional and stat utor~y- provisions requiring 
the jury to be kept secluded from all outside 
influence8. '~ 
Cf~rl a[nly the judge cannot be considered a .. ~~trang­
e r'' to the ca~e. ~l,he uta tters \\7 h 1 ch \Vere di1-3-eussed in-
volved both the lavl and the 1nerits o~}1e ~a~c.-.. The 
content of the conversation \Vas prejudicial (_\ven as 
related by the judge to counsel at a later tirnc. Of 
course the judge 'vas not purporting to d i sel ose every 
single 'vord that \vas spoken. Other significant thoughts 
could 1lave a11d prohallly did pass to the juror4 The 
defendant is certainly in no position to come forVtTUrd 
'rith the content of the conver~ation for he \Vas not 
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present ~l'he communication "\vas not proper. In light 
or U u~ statutes and the very instrnet I on~ and admonitions 
\Vhich the judge had de1lvei'Pd to the jurors, the judge 
and this juror \vCIIe guilty· of 1n i~cond uet in so r.on-
ver~ i ng. Sec ~argent vI Robert~, 1 Pick.. (~lass .. ) 337, 11 
AnL Dee. 18C, (1823)+ If the misconduct in State v~ 
Thorne "'~as deemed sufficient to justify a ne"\v trialt 
then the activity in the instant ease 1.vould certainly 
\\.,..arrant such an order. 
~l,he trinl judge and the juror in question are both 
guilty of rni8eor1duct '\rhat \Ve krlo\\- of the content or 
their eonversafion ru<ll(~ates that they diHtUH~cd the 
en~e as to its rnerrits and also as to the la\v~ On tlu~ 
face of things prejudice is sho\vn~ Certainly if front 
\vl1at the judge ~a"~ fit to place in the Record, there 
is no prejudice, the defendant should not be made to 
shoY{ prejudice in ,,~lntt \YU~ said but not recorded. Be-
cause of the very circmnstances of this incident~ prejudice 
should be presumed. The irn}Jroper action of the trial 
judge in discu~sing the case alone in his chambers 
\~rith a juror is sufficient to raise rnany ~u~picions. If 
our jury system is to n1aintain itself, if it is to b.a 
regarded as the best \vay at hand to achieve justice, 
then thi~ court must make sure that no activity is 
allo~7ed which would create suspicions of unfairness. 
The test ,,~as set forth in State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 
41~? 237 Pac. 941 ( 19.25) ~ as follo,vs: 
"I . I can it be said that appellant had the 
full benefit of trial by an impartial jury and 
one in no way influenced except by the evidence 
and the instructions of the court relative to the 
law applicable to the facts in the ease?" 
17 
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The aetion of the trial judge in di~cussing the ease 
1vith a juror J:-3 prejudicialr The defendant j ::J entitled 
to a ne"\v trial before a fair and hnparlial jury~ 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LA\V 
II'\ VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, A:\-IE~D. XI"V AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
L'TAH, ART+ I, §12 IN THAT HE \~rAS DENIED HIS RIGHT 
TO BE PRESENT AT ALL S"TAGES IN Tllo PROCEEDINGSr 
In connection vlith the cominunieation lJet\vl·en the 
trial judge and a juror \Vhich Vt'as dc~cribcd in the 
argument to Point I (page 6), the defendant 'vas 
denied his right ~ o be presP.nt at all stages of the pro~ 
ceedings. It i~ elementary ihat in a felony there can 
be no trial on the merits in the absence of the defendant 
See State v. Aikers, 87 L~tah 507, 51 P~2d 10;)~- ( 193~); 
Hopt v. People of L1 tah, 110 t.r~s. 57-1- (1883)4 
The right of the defendant t.o be present ste1ns from 
The Constitution of Utah, art l, ~ 1:1. ~'he ~tatutes of 
this state a l ~o require the presence of the defendant I 
"-' {T l C J A .. ~ ... ~ 1 S ,.....""'!' .,., ·) ~ ~ ·r~ . j r:~ 33 2 f:)ee ~ ta t ·Ot,e Tlll • .:;;.~ t ~- -l , II-~~--~ 4. ~ -- i -.), ~ '- - ~ 
77-35-3 ( 1953) I 
In State vi _._;\.ikers_t S7 l~t.ah ;>U7, ;)1 P .. 2d 1052 ( 193:) ), 
the l J"tah court stated as follo\VS : 
hThe re is no douht hut t l1 at the eon sti tu tional 
right to appear and defend in person and by 
eonnsel i ~ a sacred right of one accused of crime 
whid1 111ay not ln .. infringe~(] or frittered a \\·ny, 
and is one "\\'hich 1nay not be denied lJ,T a (\ou rt. 
or 1~t~ 'vaivPd hy ('ounscl. ... ·\Yhcther ~uch right 
18 
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rnay h(.~ \\"fli vp(l by t hP rlefendant pc·r~onall.\' 1-~ a 
(] tu:...~t iOll on \Y~1Itl1 the authorities ar{_\ divided .... 
T,he d\.\ti~lon~ tur-n on l l1P question of "~hetl1er the 
uefendl.nlt '\'H~ voluntariJy absent at suell time. 
In s U(~h (•a.~t~~ it i::; generalJy held that the de-
fendant eannot hy hi;-.; voluntary act invnljdat (~ 
the proceeding~ .. [ PnSP~ eited] 
"It is one thing for hi u1 to absent himself 
,,. hen he is at libertv a r1 ( l c~nn vol nn taril v do :so~ 
~ ~ . 
and quite another thing for the court to deprive 
hin1 of any subHtnutial rlg·ht aginst his protest 
or even ,y}Jen, in sorne r.ircnmstane.es~ he rentains 
silent. '\:here a defendant is in custody, and 
thcr:cfore not a free agent, the duty is on tl1c 
court to sec that he is personall~y· present at every 
~tagc of the trial. .... Proceeclings had in the 
absence of a defendant, ·without his fault and 
'"rithout his kno,vledge or con~ent, is ground for 
reversaL'~ 
''Thile the particular facts of f:1tatr.. r. A·ikcrs required 
a derision that. there had been no denial of constitutional 
rights, the dictim eited above iR an jndication of. the 
feeling of the court and the great i1nportance of the 
require1nent that the defrndan t he prPsenl at all stages 
in the proceeding~. 
In Hopt v. People of lTtah, 110 ·L:.s. 5·74 (lBSB), 
the defendant challenged six jurors for bias. The s ta 1 u t.e-
provided that a juror be triPd by threP impartial triers. 
The six jurors "\vere tried out of the prP.senr..e of the 
defendant and the bias '\Va~ found to he not true. rJ:he 
question presented to the court \\~as whether or not 
thi~ proceeding V'""as part of the trial. The Supreme 
Court of tl1e "'L~nitPd States held that it 'vas. In so 
doing they stated as follo"'~s: 
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''I .. the Legislature has deemed it essential 
to the protP(~tion of one -.,vhose life or liberty 
i8 involved in a prosecution for felony, that he 
shall be personally present at the trial, that i~, 
at every stage of the tt·ial \vhen hif.; substantial 
rights Ina y be af r ec.ted by the proceedings against 
hin1.. If he be deprived of his life or liberty v.rith-
out being so present, such deprivation \vnuld be 
v,..~ithout that due process or law required by the 
Constitution.'' 
The conversation br~tween the judge and the juror 
in the instant case 'vas part of the proceedings. 1 t 'vas 
held during the course of the trial. It took plaee in the 
judges charnbers .. It concerned the merits and the lavl 
of the case .. Indeed, it affected the .subt5tantial rights 
of the defendant. The defendant had a right to be 
present \vhen the conven-5ation occurred .. It is true that 
in State v~ Mortensen, 26 Utah 31 ~, 73 Pac. 562 (1903 ), 
the T; tah con rt held. tl.1at the v..Tord '~triaF1 as used in 
the con~titution and statutes \va.:, limited to the pro-
ceedings conducted in the place \vhere the court wa~ 
held, and thi~ did not include a vie\\~. llowever in that 
case the defendant kne'v full well of the view and de-
clined to go. In the instant case, the proceeding diu 
take pI ace in the c.o urt house,. and the defend ant "\Vas 
given no notice of it. The defendant 'vas in the custody 
of the court and yet no effort 1vas made to have him 
present. .As the l!tah court stated in .. A ikers, the trial 
court had a duty to see that the defendant ''Ta~ present. 
Sec also State v .. Jiorris~ 58 Or .. 397, 114 Pac. 47G (1911); 
Diaz v~ lJ ni ted Sta t.e:;~ ~:28 U IS. 4-1-:2 ( 1911). 
Not only did tl1e court have a dut.v to have the 
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defendant present, the right that defendant had to be 
present was one \vhieh could not be v.raived. In ~tate 
v. ~lannion, 19 Utah 505, G7 Pac .. 542 ( 1899), the court 
held that that \vhieh the la"\\.'" required and made essential 
on trial (•ould not be dispensed ~ith, either by consent 
of the defendant or by his failure to object to unau-
thorized methods pursued by those in authority .... :\ de-
fendant charged with a felon~y c.annot 'vaive his right 
to be personally present at trjal. See also State v. )1at-
the,vs, 191 N.C. 378, 131 S.Et 7 43 ( 1926). 
That communir.ation between the judge and jury is 
properly considered part of the proceedings is ill us~ 
trated by the many cases involving further instructions 
to the jury after they have retired. 
See State v. Duvel,. 4 N.J·. A"l isc. 1{. 719,. 134 .A.tl. 2Ka, 
af f'd, 103 ~ .J .L.. 715, 137 A tl. 718, (] 9~7) (instructions 
by telephone); State v. \V-eissman, 5 N.J. I\f isc. R .. 625, 
137 AtL 718 (1027); JTerderer v. ·Nothern Pacific Ry., 
75 N .. D. 139, 26 )J".\:t{.2d 236 (1.947); State v. ~ .. ] urphy, 
17 X .. D. 48, 115 N.,V. 84 ( 1908); State v. "\Vroth, 1.5 
"\Vash. 621, 47 Pac .. 106 (1896) .. 
In State v. ,~~l oolsey, 191Jtah 486, S'l Pac. 426 (1899), 
the court indicated that it "\\'as not necessary that the 
defendant charged with felony~ be present at filing and 
trial of motions and pleas not involving question of his 
guilt or innoc.ence on the merits .. The activity complained 
of in the instant case did go to the merits of the de-
fendants guilt. This was the very thing that was bother~ 
ing the juror. This i8 \vhy he "'~anted to talk "\Vith the 
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judge. 1'hey h1 far·t talked about the 1nerits of the case. 
D~fcnrlaTlt \VH.t-; denied due ll rocess Of lR'\\~. 
POI~T III. 
D~FENDA..NT \V,.~S DF.)JlED A FAIR TRIAL I~ THAT 
THE TRIAL JL"DGE RECEIVED AN IJt'IPROPER QCESTION 
FRQ}f A J LROR A~D TRAl'\Sl\fiTTED THIS E\lPROPER 
QIJESTIO~T TO COUNSEL . 
..~.-\_s ,,.a~ indiea.ted in the argument to Point I~ the 
trial judge discussed the 1nerits and the la\v of the instant 
case \vith a juror in the judge's chambers during the 
course of the trial.. See page 6~ This misconduct is 
objectlonrrhle in that the~ trial judge latr.r disrlosP.d the 
content of t.hls conversation to counsel. Counsel \Vere 
thereby })Ut on notice as to the matters ~'hich at least 
some of the jurors thought significant. 
Of cour~e it \vould be groBs1~· iinpt·oper for counsel 
to ntake an:~ contact ,,~ith tl~<.! jur:.- during the course of 
the trial other than t l1a t p rc~eribed by our rules of pro-
cedure. lf conn sel ,\~~· rc~ to eon uu un leatc \r i th the jury 
or any melnber thereof for ~he pnrpo~e or diseovering 
their thinking- in regard to the case, he \\'nnld of rourse 
he t;ui1ty or Jnisconrlnr.t and revrrsible error '\Yould have 
been committed. This is ~o even if c.ounsel had no thought 
of influenc1 nv tlu~ ju r~·, and in f ru·t did not. It \vould 
certain 1 ;.: he· a t.ar..1 i (·nl ad \~a ntage to under~ t and those 
rnattrr~ \vhich ,\~ere bothering nten1bers of the jury. r:11his 
tactical advantage 'Yhen given to either side. and indeed 
'\vhen given to l1nt h~ 1nny vrr)' Vt;"ell operate so as to up~et 
the ::;onu."'l luu:s delicate balance upon l\rhi(:h the sueeess 
')') 
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of our udvol~(ltc Hyste1n depends, and from "\\Thieh our 
justi,·e i~ derived. \Vhen counsPl are provided 'vith an 
under~tanding of the 'vorkings of the jnry~s n1ind, the 
defendant i~ certainly denied a fair trial ,\·ithin the mean-
ing of onr traditional jdeas of ju~Hcc and fair play. The 
del'Pndant ha8 been denied a fair trial a~ pre~el'ihed by 
the Con~titution. 
The o~('asion ~otueti uteH arises \vhen a juror has a 
question to a~ k~ 11 } ~e proper procedure r or handling such 
question~ 'vhcn tll(~y occur, flH tl1ey should, in open conrt1 
"\Vas set forth in State. v. ~Iartincz~ 7 Utah ~d 387, B~d 
P~ 2d 102 (1958). In that case the tria.l court invited and 
encouraged jurors to question vlitnet5se.s even after retire-
ment and even lNitnesses not called at the trial. T'his 
Court reversed the deci8ion of the trial court hetau~P. 
of this error~ In a concuring opinion Justice "\~\l orlhen 
f.! ta ted as f ollo,vs ~ 
"In my opinion no juror should ever be allo·w·-
ed to ask questions of the vlitnesses. If a juror 
indieates that he haR a. question the court should 
invite the juror to disclose to the court the ques~ 
tion and the court, if the question is 1~ ot yerut an.e 
to the i:3sues inrol red or is suclt as 'vould be 
clea·rly improper and therefore prej1.ulicial to the 
rights of the defe·n.da/ltts to a fair and intpartial 
trial should not permit the question to be pro-
pounded. If the question is germane to tlte i~sues, 
and "\vould not be prejudicial to the rights of the 
defendants to a fair and impartial trial, the judge 
in tuin should ask the question lrimself.'~ ( Empha· 
sis added) . 
.. .:\. que~t ion hy a jnror direc.ted to c-ounsel concerning 
counsel's taetis, or the 'vay he is handJi11g the case is an 
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intproper questiou. It is not gcnnane to the issue~ 
involved and is prejudicial to tltP rights of the defendant. 
Such a qu<:~tion t5hould ru.~vPr be allov·.:ed in open court, 
for once it is prononneed, if it eannot be anS\\.\'ered con-
sistent \vitl~ tl•e best interests of the defendant, the 
dan1age has been done. The jury is left ·with the thought 
that ~Joun~el js covering up or Vt7 ith.holding inforn1ation 
from thent. In the i11 stant <~a~e the juror in question 
should have been advised by the judge that his question 
1\ras improper. The juror should further have lJeen 
admonisl1ed not to diHell~8 t}a~ ineident w·itl1 the other 
jurors.. l~·athcr the trial judge instru(·ted the juror as 
follo'\v~: 
"I told hin1 that I \vould relate his questions 
to conusel, and leave it up to counsel to eitl1er 
at<._ .. rn pt. to re-open their ca~e and }JUt in more 
rvide1u~c to elari l'y or take care of the rnatter on 
argu1nent..'' (ll. s~)5 and S56) . 
.i\.~ far as the juror kne\\. ~ his question V/ould be 
transmitted to tounr;e1. 'He was free to djscu~s the entire 
1nat.ter 'vith the other jurors once the lnatter 'va.s. sub-
mitted. The activity in the instant. case \\'U~ capable of 
the ~arne e vii effects in regard to the jury as the activity 
\vhiel1 'vas Rtruck dn,vn as reversible error in State v. 
1\iartinez, 7 L:tah 2d 387, 826 P. 2d 102 {1958 )~ 
The hnproper quc~tion in the instant case could 
hnve influenced the jury in an unfair and prejud I rial 
manner. ,~ ... hen the question \\~as related to counsel it 
1vas effective to infotm counsel of the thinking of the 
jurors. Counsel \vere provided ,\·it h the very sa1ne infor-
mation they \vould have obt.ained if they had questioned 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the juror personally. The trial judge should have refused 
to com1nunicate \vith the juror except in open court. 
Hee page 11.. Pursuant to State v.. Martinez, s-upra, 
the judge could properly receive the juror's question in 
court in order to decide 'vhether or not it v.ras a proper 
one.. Since the question in the instant ease involved the 
tactics of (•.ounsel, it \\"U~ not ge n n ane to t lLe issues 
involved and it Vt7as clt .. arly pl·ejudicial to the rights of 
tl1e defendant The trial judge should have instructed 
the juror that hi~ question 'vas improper and could not 
be asked. The question never should have reached the 
Pars of counsel or the other jurors. 
Because of the error of the trial judge in allowing 
an improper question to be asked by a juror, the defend~ 
ant has been denied a fair triaL 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTI~G DE-
FENDANT'S J\.iOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT~S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SINCE THE JURY 
COULD NOT HAVE FOUND BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDAKT WAS GUILTY OF 
I\'IURDER. 
In Instruction No. 7 the trial judge instructed the 
jury as follows: 
, .. To 1varrant you in convicting the defendant, 
the evidence 1nust, to your m.inds, exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt 
of the defendant.. That is to say, if after an entire 
consideration and cornparison of all the testimony 
in the case, you can reasonably explain the fact~ 
given in evidence on a11y reat5onable ground other 
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than the guilt of the defendant, you should aquit 
him.H (R. 103). 
'J1hat t.lli~ i~ a proper instruction in lJtah eannot be 
doubted. ln ~tate v .. L·aub, 102 l~tah 40~, 131 P.2d 
805 ( 1942) , this Court stated as follows : 
~·.. I • the p ro~r~eu iion still 1ta~ the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant is guilty. Or stated another \vay, the 
proseeution 1nust 'not only sho'v I •• that the 
alleged facts and ti rtu n 1 ~tail(·(~~ arc t ruP, but they 
a1a:::;t all-30 be sueh f'a('1 ~ and eireu1nsta11ces that 
are irt<'Olnpatible upon any reasonable hypothesis, 
Vt'i th the innocence of the aceused, and incapable 
of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis 
other than the dcfenda 111 \ gu i 11:. ~ .. all the cireum-
81.anePs as proved mu~t be consistent v.rith each 
other~ and they are to be taken together as proved .. 
Being consistent ''"it l1 eael1 other and taken to-
gether thl~Y Jnust point ~urcly and unerringly in 
tl1e direeti011 Of guilt~' 
'Hence~ if tv.r'o reasonable hypothesis are 
pointed out b.\· the evidence and one of t h en1 points 
to t.hp dcfendan 1.~s iun<"w0.nee~ it \\·ould then he 
diffie.nlt to see hovl any jury could be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant':-) 
gui1t.'~ 
Sr~c~ a1so Statt~ v .. A . nderf.;on~ 108 1 Ttal1 1~~0, 1 ~S P. 2d 1:27 
( 1 D45) ; State v ~ Burch, 100 l.~ t n lt -! 1-!, 115 PI ~d 911 
( 1941) ; State v~ C ra1vford, 59 l~! nh 39~ ~01 Pac. 1(1:"$0 
( l D ~ 1 ) ; P ( \ o p 1 P v. Sr. n t 1 , 10 1~ t ah 217, 3 7 P a c~ : -~; L) ( 18 94) ; 
State v~ l~~r-w in, 101 l. · tah ;~();), l ~U P~ ~d ~SS, ;·~o~ ( 1941).. 
If the evidence indicate~ a reasonable ltypothesis 
as to innocence, the case should not ht.~ allo,vcd to go to 
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the jur~r. l f the facts relied on by the State are not 
inconsist(lJI t \Yith defendant\.; innocence, the innocence of 
the dP 1\jnuant is established aR a 1natte1· of la"\v. See 
~tau~ v. Anderson, supra; State v .. l 4~r,vin, supra .. 
The State relied on the faet that Rivenburgh before 
entering the attic disclos(~d a plan to k 111 the decedent 
The decedent \\·n~ killed in the att ie. a1Hl the defendant 
\\-nH there at the tinlC ol' the killing. 
Sorne of the State's \vitnesses 1vere present at the 
ti1ne Rivenburgh revealed his alleged plan, but none of 
them believed Rivenburgh "\Vas serious ( R. -±48). The 
defendant 1vas not even present at the time. lie \Vas in 
another cell v,;rith the inmnte Dripps (R· .. 41G, 417 and 
447). Neither the defendant nor Dripps heard the dis-
cussion of the alleged plan (R. 447) .. 
The first knowledge that defendant gajned of the 
killing 1vas 'vhen the tnatter 1va~ di~eusscd in a card 
game after the killing {R .. 513 and ~) 14) ~ ·rherc see1ns 
to be a dispute a~ to \\··hethcr or not there \va~ a card 
g-tllllC before the killing as \Y{_~n. rrl~{_~ ininate Stark testi-
fied that there \\··a8 ~uch a card game (R. 786, 787 and 
7D2). At that card game there ,,~as no conversation con-
cerning a plan to kill the decedent (R. 79;{). Stark 
'vas present during all of the time defendant 'vas at 
the rard ga1ne and no plan to kill the decedent \vas 
mentioned (R .. 794). 
Tho State argued that the defendant kne'" of the 
plan for the following reasons: (1) lie \vas in the next 
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ecll \vhen the plan 1vas dit5eu~sed, so he could have been 
able to hear it. 8o \Vas Dripps, ho"'~cver, l1e did not hear 
the (~onvcrsation.. (_~) The plan \ras discussed at a r..ard 
game ,,-hich \vas allegedly before the killing (R. 535), as 
\v~ll as again at another ca.rd ga1ne after the killing '\vhile 
alibis \Vt"~re being di~cussed. Ho\\~{_~ver, Stark ~'as present 
at both card games and he heard nothing of a plan to 
kill rmtil during the card gan1e held after the killing 
(lt. "794). ( 3) In defendant~s "\Vritten statement ''Thich 
\Vas taken at .J ;00 a.n1. on Auerust 29, 1958, five days 
after the ki l_lj ng, the defendant 8aid he l1eard of Riven-
burgh's plan to kill the decedent H'vl1cn all of us \vas up 
there pla~y ing cards"" ; that he thought he 'vas joking 
at first; that Rivenburgh sent him for a knife; '\\'hen 
asked h y tlH~ defendant \V l1 }' he killed the decedent, Riven-
burgh anS,\··ered that the dcfendanfs rca~on~ \vere Riven-
burgh·~s rL~rt~on ~ (R .. 51.4) .. 
The only card game that "\Vas played ''when all of 
us \Vas up thcrcH (R.ivenburglt, Dalton, Stark~ and the 
defendant} \vas a,/tf!r the killing. Certainly this ,,-as the 
only (~ard game \vherc ltivcn l1nrgh "\\'as present.. 
After the killing but five days before the defendant\=' 
~taterncnt, the defendant l1ad been pre:-:1ent "\Yhen there 
"\Vere conversations involving Rivenburgh and other in-
mates relative to the alleged planr '"hat in fact did 
l~nppen~ and !ltan)' pnssible alibis. Defendant's statement 
is merely 'vha t. he believed to be the facts of the incident. 
Attention muHt be dirr.(·ted to the fact that the 
defendant \\·as but sixteen yt~a r~ of age and had an 
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emotional age of three or four years. Certainly he had 
not led the life of the average boy before hi~ incarcera-
tion in the l;tah. State Pri~on. He had fear instilled in 
hi1n the day he entered the prison4 He "\vas used and 
and abu8ed in homosexual activities, was sold, .E,Tj_ven and 
discarded an1ong other in1nates, and "\\-a~ indoctrinated 
early that he ''{as to do \vhat others told him to do~ 
lie was a\vakened at approximately 3:30 a.nl~ out of 
a sound sleep, advised that J~o\vne had given a statement1 
advised by the investigating tcan1 that they felt Riven-
burgh vla.s really the guilty one that the defendant and 
Bo,vne 'vere ''patsies/' advised that it 'vould be "better 
for 1rim to give a statement,,~ that it 'vas ~'real irnportant 
that he tell,'' that he v,.could be sent to the Salt Lake 
County Jail if he gave the statement (R~ 512-521). In 
vie\v of the defendant's mental condition, his age, and the 
advice given to him, it i~ little v.ronder that his s ta tern en t 
is less than clear as to the sequence of P.vents. 
It is rea~onable to believe that the defendant thought 
Rivenburgh 'vas going to the attic to con1mit sodomy 
and not to kill because of the follo~'ing facts: 
1. Defendant kne\v ot no plan to kill bcforo the kill-
ing (R. 513 and 3 14). 
2~ Rivenburgh told Dalton after the killing that it 
'vas in the attic that he fjrst intended to and did 
kill the decedent. This '"as ber.ause the d ec.eden t 
Vlas going to tell about the sodomy ( li. 381), 
and berause he v.lould not perform the sodomy 
in a particular manner ( R .. i)S7). 
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34 ~·one of the State\~ \vitnesses thought Riven-
burgh 1va~ going to kill tlt(~ decedent, e.g.~ 
(a.) Xeither Stark nor Dalton thought the deeed-
ent \vould be killed in spite of tlle fact that 
tl1cy ~n \V l~ivenburgh and tlH.: decedent go 
lo the attic. 
(b) Riven burgh as ked Dripps to stand point for 
sodomy (lL 340). 
(c) Rivenburgh told ])alton that he 1-vas going 
to take the deccdC11t to the attic for sodomy 
(R~ 380 and 381). 
{d) Bov~7Jle told Ran de 1 that he and the defendant 
Vt'ent to the attic tu stand point for sodomy 
(R. 4·78). 
4. IJuring none of the n1any conver8ations~ ( 1 id the 
defendant tell anyone that he had kno\vn of u 
plan to kill before the killing (R4 349~ 350, 373-
:i"77, 3S5, -tOS-41:3, 460 and 461). 
5. 1 t. 'vas comn1on at the prison to hca r of plans to 
kill others. 
6. It v.ras eonnnon to stand point for sodo1ny in the 
a ttie and else,~lherc ( R. 388). 
7. It 'vas c.ommon to carry knives in the prison (R. 
~)~0) 
• ) .... .;:1 .. 
S. It \vas common to practice sodon1y at the prison 
{ R .. 389) ~ 
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D~ rrh~ I use () r Ainphetainine pills \\'a~ eonunon at 
the P ri ~orL ..:\ t {) ::~o 1).111.~ Rivenburgh \va.::; high 
on J' in~, arl d he· ( n l k( ~( 1 about killing the drtc·df~ll t 
:\ o one thought hint ~t~ t·iou~ beeanse of previous 
plans, threats, and ~~big talk', induc.ed by the 
pill~~ 
10. Other inmates \vho 1vere 'vitne~.'3e~ for the State 
and \\·ho kne\V o l" Rivenburgh~s .uplan," stood 
point, destroyed cvldenc(~ and joined in alibi~; 
yet they 'vere c.harged \\·lth nothing.. They could 
not receive innnunity for turning ~tate~s evidence~ 
Im1nunity can only be afforded a defc~tdant and 
that. requires court approval. l~tah (~ode Ann~ § 
77-31-7 ( 1953). The reason they \\'~-' n: not eharged 
along 'vi th the defendant, as a~3erted lJ_y· the 
prosecuting at.tornPy~s office, "~as because they 
had no intent or kno,vledge that the decedent v{as 
going to be killed. ~Phc reason they had no intent 
\\'HS becau~e tlLry did not think R.i"venhnrgh \vas 
seriont5. The defendant did not even kno'v of his 
plan. 
Even if it is reasonable to believe that a plan '.Ya~ 
effected, it is a so rea~onable to believe that the defend-
ant 1vas in the attic to stand point for sodon1y~ Even if 
the facts relied on hy the Statf~ are consistent 'vith the 
defendanVs g-nilt, thPy do not. .. ~~ .. exclude evP.ry reason-
able hy_pot hesi:::. other than the exi~tenee of sur.h fact.. ... '' 
~tntP v. ~-\ nderson, lOS ltah 1:30, 1;)s P. 2d 12·7 ( 1~)45). 
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POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFGSING TO GIVE 
DEFEKDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 43+ 
Defenda.nt~s requested instruction :\ o. -l~~ deals v.rith 
the jury's right to recommend jrnprisonment at hard 
labor for lire in tl1e event of a verdir.t of murder in the 
first degree. lt reads in part as follows: 
~' .. ~ you are instructed that \VhPther von 
rnake such a recon1menda tion is en tire I y Vl i thin 
your di.~eretion to be exercised in any manner and 
for an).. reason you see fit.. You are not to be 
influenced or intimidated by the Court in this 
absolute right of yours a~ j u ro r·s." ( R. 95). 
The law in l;tah in this area is stated in State v. 
Thorne, D6 l~t.ah 208, 117 Pac. :JS (1911). See also, State 
v. _\Iarkham, 100 TJtah 22G, 112 P. 2d 49G (1941). This 
case clear l !' i nd i(~ate~ that the recommendation is within 
the ~o]e discretion of the jury. If the jury is led te think 
that their rceorurncndation must be justified, then there 
. 
1s error .. 
In the instant (·ase tl1e trial court instructed the 
jury as follo\vs: ~-J..>rejudie(\ passion and syn1pathetic 
feelings l1ave no pla.e-e "\vhatsoPv0.r in your rlel ibcrations. 
\ ... on should disregard all bias, prejudice, and other extra-
neous influences.'~ (R .. 103). In regards to the recom-
rnendat1 on, tl1e trial court instructed t l1e jury· as f ollo\vs : 
''you are in8tructed to give it your careful and con-
scientious considers tion. ~· ( R. 11 5). 
In viev-.T of the instructions thP trial court did give, 
1vhich are noted above~ the defendant was prejudiced 
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by the <'O r·ut~:-3 refusal to give his reque~ted inHtruction 
No. 43. rrhe jury "\Vas told that S)~pathetic feelings hnd 
no plaee in their deliberations. They vlere further told 
to con~ider their recotntnendation carefullyr They 'vere 
itnpt·<.~~~ed b_y t lle fact that their recon1mendation, if 
made, \\Ta~ to be justified in sonle \VflY and not the product 
of tnere .... SJTilpathetic feelings' 1 or '~pa~sion''. This is 
<.~ontrary to the la\V as stated in State v. rrhorne, supra. 
The defendant's requested instruction X o4 43 \Yould have 
cured thi.'S di lTiculty. The trial court erred in refusing to 
give it. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NOr 20 IS CON-
FUSING AND l)l ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SEPAR-
ATE THE CRIME OF SODOMY FROM THE CRIME OF 
)lURDERt AND IN I'TS ABSTRA~CT FORIVI COULD ALLOW 
Tll~ JURY TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF MUR-
DER IF THEY BELIEVED HE AIDED AND ABETTED IN 
THE ACT OF SODOMY .. 
Instruction No. 20 is the trial court's instruction 
on ""aiding and abetting'' (R. 118 and 119). It \vould not 
be objeetiona ble if it \Vere not for the far.t that in the 
instant case more than one crime \vas involved. l.fueh of 
the testimony in trod need involved the ('l' i tne of sodo1ny 
(See e.g. It 409, 460 4 78J 716 and 7BS) 4 rfhc cri IllC of 
sodomy \va~ defined in the court:t~ instruction X o4 16 
(R. 114).. Sodoaly \vas inextricably conneeted 'vith the 
fact situation4 Sodon~~r, the criu1c against nature, i~ 
capable of engendering deep seated prejudices against 
anyone connected \Vith lt.. Indeed it must have been dif-
ficult for the jur)~ in the instant case to appreciate the 
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fact that n one 'vas being proseeuted for t111i:l aet of 
perversion. ln vie\V of this, it 1va8 error for the court 
to instruct a.s in Instruction No .. 20 .. 
In Instruction No. 20 ~ the court fails to specify 
\Vhiel1 er"tme it is ~peaking of. The Instruction reads in 
part as follo\vs: 
~~\~on are inst.ru(~tcd that one \vho keeps "\\'"atch 
'vhere a c-rin-te is being perpPtrated, so a~ to facili-
ital.e the <._ .. seape of one actuall~r eo1nmitting it, 
or to prevent his being interrupted, if the said 
keeping \vatch j~ puri:Juant to a common design to 
eornurit the crhne, said per8on keeping watch, is 
aiding and abetting, and is a principal.~' ( Emph-
asit5 added .. ) (R. 119) ~ 
"\'\Then read in the context of the evidenr..e, the court 
literall~l seetns to tell tl1e jury· that if the defendant 'vas 
toncerned in the cornl ni6t:Jion of ''a crime'~ (the crime of 
souon1y perhaps), then he is a principal in ~'any crime~' 
(the crime of tnurder included). 
rrhe defendant \Vas ella rged only -with murder~ It 
'va~ err()J" not to specify \vhieh crime tl1e jury V{BS to 
consider.. 'l,he defendant admitted tJis part in the crime 
of ~odom)'~ This, in fact, \\Ta~ his defense to the crime 
of 1nur·dcr. Yet in Instrutcion ~T D~ 20, the trial judge 
failed to Rpecify 'vhiclt crime thP aiding and abetting of 
vlould render the defendant guilty. The ;jury~ ,,~bile still 
under the irnpact of a sordid story of sexual perversion, 
'va~ free to consider tlte defendant 1 H part in the sexual 
.activities as acts capable of rendering him guilty on the 
charge of murder.. If the jur~~ cllose to follo"T this in-
struction~ the fact tl1a t the d~ ~ fendan t stood point (look~ 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
out) for an art of sodo1ny \Vas sufficient to rnake him a 
principal in the crirne of murder. 
This Court ha~ expres~ed itself on many occasions 
in regard to the use of abstract instructions. See State 
v .. Tho1npson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 15:·; (1946), and 
cases cited therein. Instruction No. 20 is needlessly ab~ 
stract in failing to substitute the tenn "rnurder'' for the 
general ter·n1 "c.rime". In vie"\v of the peculiar facts of 
this case, the shocking and highly distasteful facts involv-
ing sodomy, the failure of the trial court to indi<·nte that 
it was the aiding and abetting of murder and only mur-
der which \vould tnake the defendant a pr1nelpal in the 
crime charged "\vas greatly prejudiciaL 
The prejudicial nature of this instruction \vas not 
cured by a correct staternent or the la\v elseo,vhere ln 
the in~tructions~ See Soda v ... :\-1 arriot, 118 Cal. App. 
635, G P. 2d 675, 677 ( 1931). rr his rule is especially true 
in a criutinal case 'vhere the crime charged iH punishable 
by death.. 'rhe trial judge in his instructions should take 
special care to remove any material whicl• is erronons 
or unnecessarily abstract and thus prej udi (•.lal to the 
defendant. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO~ 17. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 17 reads as 
follo,vs: 
"You are instructed that where the direct 
evidence is conflicting as to 'vhether the defendant 
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J es~e "\f. 0 are.ia, .Jr. killed Leroy J usc ph 1l erner 
and \vhcLre eitlu~r part or all of the evidence is 
eirelllllS Lan tial evidenee, t 1 ~ c~ defendant's 1notvie to 
do t lH~ acts in quet5tion or his absence of ntotive 
should be considered by you as strong evidence 
of the guilt or innocence of the aceuscd. 'fhe ah-
Renr~t· oi" a n1otive on the part of the defendant 
Jesse ).f. ( j arcia, Jr. to kill T J e 1· o y J o s e ph \~ern t~ r 
sj rc11gthcns the pre:-.;urnpl.ion of defendanfs jn-
nocence and 1nay raise a reasonable doubt as to 
his guilt.'' ( R. 68). 
The trial judge refused to give this ins tructiu n to the 
jury (R. GS )~ 
No n1otive \Vas as~rrted or shov~rn a~ far n~ the 
defendant 1vas concerned. The absence of any proof as 
to n1otive tends to indicate innocence. See People v. 
Tom '\V'oo, lSl Calif~ ;~15, 1~-1: Pac. 3S9 ( 1919) r \\"here 
reliance is plac·ed entirely on circumstantial evidence to 
establish a cri1ne, absence of 1notivc is a circumstance 
tending to clear the accused. See Slater \. State~ .2~4 
Ind. f.t27, 70 N.E~ 2d 425 ( 1947). "\~'lhile the presence or 
absence of motive is not proof of a substantive fact~ its 
absence ~t1·engthens the presnn1ption of innocence~ See 
Thornas v. (~nnnn., 1S7 \r:=t. 265, 4G S.E. 2d ;~SS (1948 )~ 
DcfcndarJt \vas entltlcd to l1ave 1:hc jur~- con~ider the 
ahsencP. or an~y- prof as to n1otive, and tlu? trial judge 
erred in not submitting defendant's Requested Instrue-
tion No. 17 to the jury~ 
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POINT VIII.. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I)l" REFCSING TO GIVE 
D!·~F~NDA~T'S REQ"CBSTED INSTRUCTIO~S NO. 19 AND 
NO. 21. 
DefendaJl t ,~ J{~·q_lu~~ted I n~truction X o~ 19 readH as 
f•)llO\\'H: 
"\-ou are instructed that if ~you find from 
all o [' t.he evidence in the case that the dei'enrlant, 
J l•Hsc ~L {J arit·u~ .Jr. [sic] vlas in the attic n t the 
t i In(_~ I_jero y Joseph '_.r erner 1vas killed for the pur-
pose or ~tanding point "Thile an act of ~odo1ny 
\,·as ernnmi tted and that Leroy J o~e ph \ T erner 
\V8H killed a.s a result of an independent art and 
intention on the part of the defendant, ~lark 
~lerril Rivenburgh, ·you must find the defendant, 
~ J essie ~I. Garcia, tT r. ~ 'Not Guilty.' n ( R. 7 0) r 
Defendane~ Requested l.nstruc:.tion Xo. :!1 has the same 
~ignificance except that the addnd factor of a fight 
in the attic "\vas dealt ·w·i th, and the jur·y was asked to 
consider the defendant "s intent jn regards to s nrh a fight. 
See~ R .. 72. 
These instructions in substance contained defendant's 
defense. .He \Vent to the attic. jn compljance with an 
order fro1n a person he greatly feared to function as a 
lookout during an act of pervcr~ion~ He did not intend 
to kill, or to do great bodil~v hat·nl to the decedent or 
anyone elt:e. He \\"tt6 not a1vare of any p'an 01· irdent on 
behalf of the inrnate J{ivcnbu rgh~ l l~ the ju1·y thought 
it reasonable to believe the defendant_t then cef·t.ainly 
lu:~ 'vas not guilty of tnurdcr in the fir~t degree. 
Defendant had a right to have the jury instructed 
as in his Requested Instructions No .. 19 and No. 21. See 
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State v. E.vans, 7-l l!tah 389, 3D6, .279 Pac. 950 (1929). It 
'".-as prejudicial to hirn not to have his t}Jcory of defense 
be I' 0 n_~ the j U I' y ~ rr h j H is e spe cia 11 y S 0 in V j e \V 0 f the 
instruction the court did give .in the form of Instruction 
No. 20 ( R-.. 118 and 119). Sec page 33. 
POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REF"LSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IKSTRL.-;CTION NO. 20, 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20 reads as 
follO\VS: 
'~ lf after a consideration of the evidence you 
conclude that it is rea~onable to believe that the 
defendant J est:1e )f. Ga.rria, J r4 intended to commit 
rnurdcr ar1d also rcaf.:onahle to believe that he 
intended to stand point for sodo1ny~ you have 
no d11ty to detern1ine 1vhich of the hvo is rnore 
reasonable but should find the defendant "1\ ot 
Guilty~~. ( R~ 7 1) 4 
This instruction injeets the defendant~s theory of defense 
into the reasonable h)iJOthesis rule4 
It is 1Nell settled that the reasonable hypothesis 
rule jg the la\v of Utah. See page 26. The trial court 
instructed the jury as to thls rule in the courfs Instrur-
tion i\ o~ 7 ( R. 103) ~ This instruct] on 'vas ho,vever ab-
stract in nature and dj ffjcult for the jury to understand. 
DefPndan t's Requested Instrur.t.ion ~To. 20 n ~ l~ re l.Y inserted 
the names and alternate theories into the abstract in-
struction. 
Abstract in::!tructions should be avoided. See State 
v. Thon1pson ~ 110 LT t al1 113, 170 P. 2d 153 ( 1946), and 
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cases cited therein. j)ef(~lJdant'~ Requested Instruction 
:\' o .. ~0 1nerely helped to get the defendant's theory of 
defcn~t-- before the jury \vithin the tneaning of the reason-
able hypothesis rule .. Certainly the defendant ,,-a~ entitled 
to hu ve his defense before the jury. Sec page 37. 
Certainly the reasonable hypothesis theory~~ n1ore mean-
1ngfnl to a jury~ 'vhen it is stated in tern1~ of the evidence .. 
The trial judge erred in not Hubtnit t ing defendantts 
requested instruction No. 20 to the jury, and the defend-
and was prejudiced thereby .. 
POINT X .. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPEL 
THE PROSECUTION TO FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS 
AND COPIES OF STATEMENTS MADE BY WITNESSES 
AND THE DEFENDANT. 
The Prosecution was permitted, while exannnJng 
witnesses and the defendant at trial, to refer to notes, 
contents of tape recording~ and statements taken during 
the State's investigation of the facts. 
rl,he full contents of such documents should h..1.Ve 
been afforded counsel for the defendant as argued in his 
~lotion to Produce Documents (R. 16 and 17) r The pros-
ecution had the unfair advantage of quoting 'vords out 
of con text. This jeopariliz ed .counsel for the def en dan t 
in his cross-examination and re-direct. Quoting Vrlords 
out oF context is especially unfair and prejudicial 1n the 
instant ease because of the great amount of circumstantial 
evidence. 
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In his (·ros~-exa1ninaiion, the pro~ecution \vas in a 
position to impress the jury that ever.ything he stated 
\vas (~ontained in the notes, tape reeording or statetnents, 
when in f.act it mighi. never havfl been. J~ecause the 
\vitnc\~~ eould not remember everything that \va::; said at a 
definite ti tne and plaee rnany montl1s prior to trial)' it 
"\vas implied that he vlas falsely testifying. This coul.-l 
l1ave been cured by ref re~ l1ing the 'vitness's memory on 
rc-djrcet~ "\\Tithout the proper doc.uments, support "\Vas 
i rn poss1b1 e . 
.t\n unfair and prejudicial advantage \vas afforded 
t.hc pl'O~f~en tion by the error committed by the trial court 
in failing to e.ompel the production of documents as 
rcqur~stcd in defendant's motion. 
POINT XI. 
THE TRIAL COL~RT ERRED IN REFUSI~G TO GRANT 
A KEW TRIAL. 
_..:\. ne\r trial should have hPOTl g"ranted for the reasons 
(' j ted in de f enrlan rs 1no ~ ion ( lt. 182 and 133). llere it 
1vas specifically brought to thf~ conrt~s attention that 
the defendant '\Yas not pre~ent during al1 stages of the 
proceedings. See page 18. The improper communica-
tion \v.ith the jury was also relied upon. See page 6. 
Derendant.''s motion for a ne1-v trial also indicated 
thal. the jury \vas separated during its deliberations. Tl1is 
'\vas ocea~ion~d 1vhen tl1e bailiff took six jurors at a time 
do,vn an P 1 evrd or for purpose of going to the re::!t room .. 
For the reasons set f ortl1 in defendant's 1Iotion For 
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New Trial (R .. 132 and 133), especially those noted above 
whit·ll \Vel'(_~ argued in detail in connection 'vith the argu-
Inents to Point I and Point II, the trial judge erred in 
not granting a new trial. 
POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COCRT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT,S :\IOTION TO STRIKE TES'TI:\'10~1:T W IIICH WAS 
ADMITTED ON 'THE STATEjS REPRESENTATION THAT 
IT WOULD SHOW A CONSPIRACY TO COM]rilT MURDER .. 
1\ great deal of te ~ tilno ny prejudic.ial to the de-
fendant ''.ras adtnitted during the trial on the State'~ 
repreHentation that it 'vould show a conspiracy to conl-
Init Inurder on the defendantts part .. Illustrative of 
this was the testimony of ''Tilliam Randel, an .J n1na te 
\\=-ho testified for the State as to a certain conversation 
bet\veen himself and Rivenburgh prior to the killing. 
Randel stated that the defendant "\Vas not present during 
the conversation. The conversation 1\Tas objected to as 
hearsa~y and a motion to strike was n1ade. This was 
denied (R. 418). The objection was raiRed again, and 
the State explained the testimony as ''the start of a 
conspiracy." (R. 419 and 420). 
The State presented a great deal of testhnony \vhich 
\ras hearsay as to the defendant because he was not 
present. T'ltis testirnony dealt ''rith conversations be-
t,vecn Rivenburgh and other~ and Bo1\7De and others. 
The testimony served to impress the jury with the 
fact that there w a~ some kind of a plan to kill After 
the State's case, the defendant once more moved to 
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strike on the grounds that the State had failed to tie 
the defendant to the so called conspirary (R. 530). 
The record is rather confut:Jjng as to the court's 
l'uling on tl~i~ motion and it rnay be that tl~e court 
ne·ver, in fact, made a ruling. lf the courf~ action or 
laek of action is construed as a denial, then jt erred 
in den)"· i ng the rnotion. The on 1 y evldener. \v hj e h the 
State eonld point to that \\·ould serve to connc~(·i. the 
defend ant to any kind of COil spiracy v.,:ras con i-ainerl in 
the defendant' f.; state1nent {R. 5~36) r This statement dealt 
\Vi tl1 a conversation \Vhieh 'vas had during a card game. 
The evidence is clear that the card game \Vas had after 
the killing. This point i~ covered in detail in the argu-
ment to Point TIT. See page 23. 
]~he StatL~ failed to tie to the defendant the evi-
dence introduced \\·hich tended to shov~r a conspiraC)'. 
rrlll~ l.rjal COUl't erred in not striking this tP.stimony from 
~he record. 
POINT XIII. 
THB TRIAL COl:RT ERRED T~ SUBl\fiTTING THE 
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF MURDER 
I~ THF. FIRST DEGREE SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
DEFEKDANT'S )-!ENTAL COKDITlON PREVENTED HI:\1 
FROD.-1 PREJ\IEDITATING OR 11ELIBERATI~G. 
·rhe test r1nnny intr()duced relative to the defendant's 
mental condition 1\·a~ somP\\·l~at c·njl fut:Jing. Dr~ CJarenr.e 
Craig 1\ elsun tc·~tified that j n his opinion, under the 
ei n~u u n.; tnru·(~~ of tl1 is 1nciden t, the defendant \ras unable 
to premeditate and deli l ,era te upon the killing (It 43S 
and 459) ~ Dr~ Nelson i~ a P-~;T{~hiatrist \vho 1vas ern-
42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ployPd by the Htate for a nuu•ber of years (R-. 593, 594 
and 596). 1 i e had an o p portu11 i ty, by virtue of his em-
plo~nnent., to observe and cxantine the defendant on 
~t~veral oe("a~lonH over a long period of ti1ne~ (I·t 59;3-
GOG)4 Dr4 Lincoln D. ·Clark and Dr. Richard lver~on 
testified as witnesses for the State (R. 797 and 812 ). 
In substance, Dr. Clark's opinion 'vas contrary to that 
of Dr. Nelson':-:; although the only examination 'vhi{!h Dr. 
Clark n1ade of the defendant \vas made during the 
action for the purpose of testifying at the trial (R. 811). 
Dr. Iverson did not give an opinion as to the defendant's 
ability to pretncditat.e or deliberate the c.rJ.me charged. 
The la\\~ in Utah re1ative to di1ninishing and partial 
responsibilit}· is set forth in State v4 Green, 78 Vtah 
580~ 6 P.2d 177 ( 1931). It is clear that if the defendant 
is affected ''{it h a 1n en tal di s8a s e "r hieh p rev en ts hin1 
fron1 deliberating or premeditating, then the jury can-
not find hjrn guilty of rnurder in the first degree~ See 
also, 'Vashington V~ State, 165 X eb~ 275, 85 X.\V. ld 
509 ( 1957) ; State v. Franco, 347 P.2d 312 (N.~1. 1959); 
cf., State V~ _A_nselnl o, -+6 lJ tah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 ( 1915). 
ln the instant case~ the testimon}' presents a con-
flict of Px pert witnes~e~. Certainly the jury· could not 
find hPyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant \vas 
capable of premeditating and deliberating. If the experts 
the·nlselves could not agree af.; to the mental ability of 
the defendant, it is doubtful that laymen, 'vho kno"\v 
nothing at all about psychiatry could be in perfect 
agreement. The court erred in submitt.ing this question 
to the jury. As a 1natter of law there is reasonable doubt. 
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(~(JXCLl1 Sl()X 
The defendant has been denied the due process of 
la\v- 1vhich i~ guaranteed by our (:onstitut!ons. lie has 
been (lcprived of a fair trial 1Jcfore an in1partial jury. 
The evidence in this caf.;e did not \va.rrant submission 
to the juiJ"" on the question of }I urder in the First 
Degrect and the defendant't:1 eonvicti on of such charge 
is not substantiated by the evidence. ~rhe trial and 
verdict eonstitute a rniscarriage of jui-;t]ee and should 
be reversed. 
Respectfull :,-~ submitted, 
Jl.i\ N~E~ AND MILLF~It 
Counsel for Appellant 
410 ~Jmpire Building 
Salt Lake City, r.;tah 
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